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The Musical Work Reconsidered, In Hindsight
Gavin Steingo
1. Introduction and Outline of the Argument
Certainly, the concept of the musical work has not always existed. Yet 
deciphering precisely when the work emerged has proved an immense-
ly difficult task for musicologists.1 In particular, the publication of 
Lydia Goehr’s The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works—in which she 
famously argued that the work–concept crystallized around 1800—has 
provoked an endless litany of modifications and outright rebuttals.2 
In many cases scholars have retained the gist of Goehr’s argument but 
have sought to push the date backwards, often to the period of their 
own specialization. Several scholars of Baroque music have argued 
that musical works existed in the seventeenth century (although not 
before) while several scholars of the Renaissance have argued that the 
musical work emerged during that era (although not earlier).3 Indeed, 
there have been attempts—although somewhat muted—to locate the 
advent of the musical work in the Medieval period.4 In particular, the 
question of whether J. S. Bach composed musical works has received a 
great deal of attention. Although he died a full fifty years before 1800, 
several scholars have argued that Bach did compose musical works and 
have used this argument as a refutation of Goehr’s 1800 hypothesis.5
Most recent studies have in fact been written as direct confronta-
tions with Goehr’s seminal text. Goehr (2000, 2007) herself has oc-
casionally been pulled into the fray and has defended her position 
valiantly and with gusto. Indeed, there are many reasons to take her 
arguments seriously and in some ways the historical archive seems 
to support the 1800 hypothesis. Nonetheless, if we consider the sheer 
number of scholars who have contested her hypothesis (or at least her 
dating) there is reason to suspect that perhaps the puzzle has not been 
adequately solved. In this essay, I revisit this crucial issue by shifting 
the emphasis from dating (that is, from the question of when the musi-
cal work emerged) to historiography. If quibbling about the precise 
date of the emergence of the musical work has proved largely ineffec-
tual, then perhaps it is time to radically rethink our mode of historical 
investigation. I suggest that one useful way to proceed is to shift the 




Every discussion, historicization, or analysis of the musical work must 
face the dilemma of defining what a musical work is in the first place. Few 
musicologists today would have difficulty accepting the argument that the 
musical work is historically contingent, that is, that it is not a transcendental 
category.6 I take it as a given that the musical work is historical and, moreover, 
contested. One common—and, I would submit, quite reasonable—criticism 
of Goehr is that she too narrowly defines the parameters of the musical 
work. Perhaps the work–concept was not operative in the early eighteenth 
century in the same way that it was in the early nineteenth, but should this 
mean that there was no conception of a musical work in any way at all?7 In 
other words, could we not argue for a pluralization of the very notion of 
work–ness and subsequently recognize different types of musical works at 
different historical periods?
It seems to me that we do need a flexible definition of the musical work. 
It is efficacious, in other words, to move away from a single moment at which 
the musical work emerged and to instead examine various types of related 
concepts and practices both before and after 1800. At the same time, it is 
not unreasonable to recognize major musical transformations where they 
have occurred. And indeed, few (if any) researchers deny that something we 
may call the musical work (however broadly defined) emerged at some point 
during the past five hundred years. The question is simply at what point it 
did so, under what conditions, and to what musical and social ends.
Despite the many disagreements surrounding the musical work, a rela-
tively stable constellation of terms and ideas is readily discernable in recent 
scholarship on the topic. In particular, music’s growing reliance upon the 
score is almost unanimously understood as a major development in the ad-
vent of the musical work. In reality, the score is only one part of a much larger 
story, which must necessarily also include issues such as compositional (or 
authorial) control, the possibility of repeatability, the notion of permanence, 
and the emergence of aesthetic autonomy as a core European ideology.
I will address and complicate many of these issues in the course of 
this article. At this stage, and at the risk of being overly reductive, it will be 
sufficient to tentatively characterize the development of the musical work 
as a transition or even inversion of “where” music is located. When music 
notation first emerged in the West, inscription was understood as second-
ary to musical performance. In other words, music was understood first 
and foremost as an act of performance and the function of notation was to 
supplement this act, either as a series of more or less (usually less) specific 
instructions, or as a form of memorialization after the fact. The advent of 
the musical work marks the point at which this relationship is inverted: now, 
performance is secondary and attests to a primary (or more fundamental) 
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“work” manifested most precisely in the form of a score. With this inversion, 
the basic ontological status of music changes such that individual perfor-
mances are merely (better or worse) instantiations of a work that exists over 
and above all of the possible performances that may ever take place. Indeed, 
a work of music may exist that is never performed (as happens all too fre-
quently in the lives of many young composers today).
My aim is neither to celebrate this inversion as a major achievement nor 
to bemoan it as a transformation complicit with the degradation of music 
qua act. Furthermore, I readily acknowledge that a musicologist could easily 
focus on aspects different to the ones I have emphasized here or even—as I 
have implied—dismiss the entire project of historicizing the musical work 
as so much nonsense, since the “history of the musical work” begs the very 
question that it seeks to answer. Nonetheless, refuting the inversion to which 
I point is actually not the primary target of most scholarly debate. On the 
contrary, scholars generally agree on this important shift in the ontological 
status of music and the musical score (although often not in exactly those 
terms) and disagree mostly on the issue of dating.
If we can tentatively assume that the musical work exists in a relatively 
coherent manner, then when did it emerge? Beethoven certainly wrote 
musical works, but did Bach? Did Monteverdi? Did Palestrina? What about 
Josquin, or Ockeghem? It seems to me that instead of answering these ques-
tions directly a more oblique response may prove more valuable.
To this end, I draw on the work of the philosopher Noam Yuran and 
propose a novel approach to the question of historical change. As a way into 
the argument, I begin by considering a structural analogy between the his-
tory of the musical work and Yuran’s analysis of the history of money. I am 
not arguing for a direct causal relationship between the histories of music 
and money, nor am I proposing an economic “basis” for music’s history. 
Instead, I use the analogy with money purely as a heuristic device and as a 
way to introduce Yuran’s complex ideas.8
Yuran begins by observing that economic historians have long docu-
mented the use of precious metals as units of exchange in ancient civili-
zations. In the case of metals such as silver or gold, value was determined 
through weight. In Adam Smith’s classic formulation, the institution of coins 
was borne of practicality: 
The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with exactness 
gave occasion to the institution of coins, of which the stamp, covering en-
tirely both sides of the piece and sometimes the edges too, was supposed 
to ascertain not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal. Such coins, 
therefore, were received by tale as at present, without the trouble of weigh-
ing. (Smith 1904, 28)9
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Smith’s orthodox explanation is that the symbol (the “stamp”) testifies 
to the material quantity (weight) of the piece of metal. The symbol tells the 
user about the material substance and by doing so relieves her of having to 
weigh the substance each time. This rather banal explanation of the institu-
tion of coins receives an interesting twist when viewed from the perspective 
of modern (or “fiat”) money.10 With modern coins (such as the ones we use 
today), the symbol (currency value) does not signify the material substance 
as much as the material substance attests to the legitimacy of the symbol.
In other words, directly following the advent of coins with stamps, a 
suspicion that the stamp (or symbol) was fake led to a suspicion about the 
material substance to which that stamp attested. If there was something 
fishy about the stamp on a piece of metal alleging to be gold, then one had 
every right to suspect that there was something wrong with the piece of 
metal as well. A dodgy stamp was probably a sign of some kind of coun-
terfeiting, which meant that the metal bit under consideration was either 
of poor quality or did not correspond to the unit of weight that the (false) 
stamp alleged. (In the worst case, the metal itself may not be “precious” at 
all—instead of gold it may just be some kind of slag.)
With modern money, however, the reverse is true: any doubt about the 
legitimacy of the material substance can lead only to a suspicion that the 
symbol is fake. Put simply: if a one–dollar bill does not have a watermark 
then it is not worth one dollar. This explains why, when a large quantity of 
counterfeit coins or notes is discovered, the state’s response is to compound 
and destroy the coins or notes and not simply to scratch off the currency 
signs. (On the other hand, it would have made more sense in the case of 
early fake coins to simply scratch off the stamp.)
Smith’s history of coins presented above is therefore only interesting 
when we consider its surprising ending. As Yuran (2014, 133) observes: 
“The symbol is instituted to attest to its material substance but by this 
very attestation, it makes the material substance redundant; it renders 
materiality secondary in importance in comparison to the symbol. The 
symbol replaces in its function that which it symbolized.” In other words, 
the stamp to which Smith refers at first attests to the material substance 
(“ascertain[ing] not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal,” as he 
puts it), but through this “attestation” something strange happens. Precisely 
by attesting to the material substance, the stamp becomes more important 
than that substance, which is now relegated to secondary importance.
The exact same—or at least parallel—unexpected ending occurs in 
the case of the musical work. At first, the score serves to assist musicians 
in forthcoming performances of a particular piece or else memorializes a 
performance that has already taken place. But at some point an inversion 
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occurs and performances of a piece are understood as an instantiations 
of that piece—or what we could now call a work. In other words, and to 
paraphrase Yuran: the symbol (score) is instituted in order to attest to a 
material practice (musical performance), but by this very attestation it 
makes the material practice of performance redundant, it renders mate-
riality of secondary importance in comparison to the symbol. Of course, 
strictly speaking neither the material substance of modern coins nor the 
material practice of performance is redundant. The point is simply that 
these material “bases” attest to, or are secondary to, their “symbols.”11
Returning to the history of money, we may ask: at what point did 
things change? At what point did the symbol stop attesting to the mate-
rial substance and become primary, only to have the material substance 
attest to it? Here, another surprising result announces itself, namely that it 
is theoretically impossible to discern when the shift from substance sup-
ported by symbol to symbol supported by substance took place. I quote 
Yuran (2014, 133–34) at length: 
The only possible temporality of this change is of that which has already 
happened. Indeed there can be points in time when people acknowledge 
the fact that a change has already taken place . . . A posterior recognition 
in change implies that a real change has already happened beforehand. 
Simply put, if we accept that there is a real difference between the two 
forms of coin in the story, between a gold coin and fiat coin—a distinction 
which does not seem at all far fetched—then the real transition between 
them must have occurred sometime. Yet it is theoretically impossible to 
locate this point in time. (emphasis in the original)
The notion of posterior recognition—which, we will soon see, was already 
obliquely suggested by Goehr—has tremendous explanatory power in terms 
of the musical work as well. In a manner structurally identical to money, it is 
theoretically impossible to determine when the shift from material practice 
(performance) supported by symbol (score) shifted to symbol (score) sup-
ported by material practice (performance). Indeed, I would argue that locating 
this shift is not only theoretically impossible but also ontologically undecideble. 
In other words, it is not simply that “we” as humans, because we have insuf-
ficient reasoning abilities, are unable to determine the shift. Instead, the shift 
itself is theoretically non–locatable because it did not ever “happen” as such. 
The best we can say is that the change has already taken place at some prior 
moment, but we cannot ever locate that moment in time.
If my argument holds any water, then perhaps it is possible to at last 
understand the frustration over determining the emergence of the musical 
work, because it is theoretically impossible to discern when the musical work 
emerged. I will return to this theoretical dilemma later and will suggest a way 
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to move beyond the impasse. But before doing so, it is necessary to more care-
fully examine the musicological controversies and debates surrounding the 
musical work. In the following sections I summarize Goehr’s position and then 
proceed to more carefully evaluate several prominent criticisms leveled against 
it. In my view, the fact that Goehr’s argument has remained standing at all in 
the face of a kind of total onslaught implies its veracity, if only partial. On the 
other hand, the fact that her argument has never ceased to provoke scandal 
seems to imply that there is something truly troublesome, or even aporetic, in 
the thesis she proposed more than twenty years ago.
2. Synopsis and Critical Analysis of The Imaginary Museum of 
Musical Works
Lydia Goehr’s The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works is divided into two 
sections. The first section addresses strictly philosophical considerations 
by focusing on the work of aesthetically–oriented analytical philosophers. 
Goehr’s main point in this first section is that all ahistorical approaches in-
evitably run aground because the musical work is a thoroughly historical 
concept.12 I will not devote any more space to the first section of her book 
(which in any event acts primarily as a foil to the second part) because I as-
sume that the vast majority of readers of this journal require no convincing. 
That is to say, few musicologists today don’t believe that the musical work is 
historically contingent. If there are disagreements, these are only about the 
“when” of the work and sometimes also on how we should understand this 
quite complex concept.
In the second part of her book, Goehr turns to the history of the musical 
work. Her central claim is that the work–concept became regulative around 
the year 1800.13 What, precisely, does this mean? One handy way to unpack 
the claim is to recall the title of her book: for Goehr, musical works are those 
that belong in an “imaginary museum.”14 The term “imaginary” immedi-
ately disqualifies one common interpretation of her thinking, namely the 
assertion that for Goehr works are equivalent to scores.15 The importance of 
notation and scores notwithstanding, for Goehr musical works are reducible 
neither to their performances nor their scores (nor, in fact, to anything and 
everything else). Indeed, musical works are “ontological mutants” which:
do not exist as concrete physical objects; they do not exist as private ideas 
existing in the mind of a composer, a performer, or a listener; neither 
do they exist in the eternally existing world of ideal, uncreated forms. 
They are not identical, furthermore, to any one of their performances . . . 
Neither are works identical to their scores. (Goehr 2007, 2–3)16
87
Gavin Steingo
The “object” that we call the musical work was achievable only 
“through projection or hypostatization.” Because scores and perfor-
mances are “worldly or at least transitory and concrete items” they can 
never fully match the status of a musical work, which in the early nine-
teenth century were understood as the “permanently existing creations 
of composers”. It is precisely for this reason that the only “museum” 
capable of housing musical works is an imaginary or metaphysical one 
(Goehr 2007, 174).
Having said this, the score remains a crucial piece of technology in 
Goehr’s project. Scores, she says, translate the “ideal of untouchability 
into concrete terms” (Goehr 2007, 224). In her view, they mediate the 
relationship between “the abstract (the works) with the concrete (the 
performances)” (231). Furthermore, although Goehr does not equate 
works with notation, she does notice that the emergence of the concept 
of the musical work was closely tied to an increasing reliance on scores. 
“[A]s long as the composers provided incomplete or inaccurate scores,” 
she writes, 
the idea of performance extempore could not acquire its distinct op-
posite, namely, the fully compliant performance of a work. Such a 
contrast emerged fully around 1800, just at the point when notation 
became sufficiently well specified to enable a rigid distinction to be 
drawn between composing through performance and prior to perfor-
mance. (188)
In other words, although Goehr emphasizes that works are not equiva-
lent or reducible to scores, it is the score and not a performance that 
most authentically mediates the work after 1800.17
The emergence of the musical work was also closely related to a re-
configuration of the category of music itself. For this reason, Goehr de-
votes a substantial portion of her text to the aesthetic theory of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Among the many defining 
characteristics of aesthetic theory, one thing stands out: the separation 
of art from the world of ordinary and mundane experience. In other 
words, a key factor of aesthetic theory is the autonomy of art. Music, as 
is well known, came to be understood in the course of the nineteenth 
century as the most autonomous and perhaps most “abstract” of all the 
art forms, primarily by dint of its alleged non–referentiality.
Nonetheless, music’s autonomy was closely associated with its het-
eronomy: “the new romantic aesthetic allowed music to mean its purely 
musical self at the same time that it meant everything else” (Goehr 2007, 
157).18 What Goehr calls the “romantic illusion” presented the possibil-
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ity “of an object, a person, or an experience, to exhibit simultaneously 
the character of the human and the divine, of the concrete and the tran-
scendent” (158). In the case of music, this meant that the “emancipa-
tion” from extra–musical meaning was coupled with a counter–gesture 
in which music came to represent transcendence and the absolute.
Before 1800, by contrast, music was tied to—and in large part consti-
tuted by—its extra–musical function (Goehr 2007, 122). Performances 
were judged less in terms of how well a pre–existing work was executed 
than “on whether an audience had been efficaciously affected in a man-
ner appropriate to the occasion” (192). The activity of performance, 
tethered to a particular social or political event, was always emphasized 
over and above the production of a “physical construction,” namely the 
score (124). The social utility of performance was prized above all else, 
and the function of a score was mainly to assist in the execution of a 
successful performance. “[E]ven if musicians were beginning to see 
composition as an activity that took place quite independently of actual 
performance activity,” writes Goehr, “they might still have continued to 
see the former as truly completed only in the latter” (198).
This brief summary of Goehr’s seminal text is, of course, selective. 
And indeed, her central claim that the work–concept became regula-
tive around the year 1800 can only be understood comprehensibly after 
a careful analysis of the terms “concept” and “regulative”—I return to 
those terms later. On the most basic level, though, her argument about 
the advent of the musical work turns on the same “inversion” that I re-
ferred to above. Before 1800, says Goehr, performance was prioritized 
over inscription. After 1800, by contrast, musical performances attest to 
a “work” that exists over and above all possible performances. Although 
Goehr does not equate the work with the score, she does suggest that 
the score is the material technology that most authentically mediates the 
metaphysical musical work. As such, although my tentative character-
ization of the musical work presented in the introduction places more 
weight on notation than does Goehr, it retains the deeply historical reso-
nances of The Imaginary Museum, along with the notion that the work–
concept comes—at some point in history—to dominate performance.
In order to more fully elucidate the advantages and limitations of 
Goehr’s position, and as a pathway towards an elaboration of my own 
main argument, in the following section I examine in some detail the 
criticisms leveled against The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works. One 
important point of contestation, to reiterate, is when the work–concept 
emerged. Goehr’s answer—“around 1800”—has been the subject of nu-
merous criticisms and it is to those criticisms that I now turn.
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3. Conceptual Criticisms of The Imaginary Museum of Musical 
Works
Goehr’s central claim that the work–concept crystallized around 1800 has 
been variously termed the “1800 thesis,” “the Watershed Thesis” (Dyck 
2010), and the “‘Great Divide’ Hypothesis” (Young 2005, 175). One fre-
quent, and in some ways quite obvious, criticism of the 1800 hypothesis 
is that history unfolds gradually and that presenting a precise year is thus 
inherently reductionist. Commenting on the “sharp line of distinction be-
tween the concept of music composition as a craft—or métier—before 1800, 
and that of musical practice seen as a transcendental fine art, after 1800,” 
William Erauw asks “whether such sharp distinctions can be made.” For 
him, offering “drastic lines of division in history, i.e. dividing history into 
blocks, is always dubious”—so much so, he says, that “we could suspect the 
whole approach as being an anachronistic construction of the historian” 
(Erauw 1998, 111) . Echoing this sentiment, Reinhard Strohm asserts that 
expressions such as “for the first time” and “at this point”—which, he ob-
serves, are used frequently by Goehr—rely on “a demonstration that these 
things had never happened before.” For Strohm, such a demonstration is 
“manifestly impossible” because all historical change is gradual (Strohm 
2000, 135). Locating (or claiming to locate) an exact cut–off point is thus, 
for him, quite illogical.
Goehr is not particularly threatened by this criticism. As she clearly 
states in The Imaginary Museum, “Finding a ‘rough’ date is satisfactory 
because conceptual change, like the change in practices, has no sharply 
defined beginning or end” (Goehr 2007, 110). In other words, she agrees 
with her critics that historical change is gradual. The date 1800 is for her 
simply a convenient marker of what she takes to be an obviously much 
more stretched out historical development. Philip Tagg (2000, 163) thus 
states that he 
is in agreement Lydia Goehr that it was around 1800—and, it should be 
added, primarily among intellectuals in German–speaking Europe—that 
the concept of “work” (in the sense of musical end product or com-
modity) started to become more frequently identified with the superior 
aesthetic values that many keepers of the “classical” seal have attributed 
to a certain kind of Central European instrumental music ever since. 
(emphasis mine) 
Tagg fully acknowledges that, as he says, “positing a conjuncture of ideas 
and events . . . cannot be explained in simple terms of linear causality” 
(162). His Marxian approach recognizes “the conflux of a multitude of 
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lengthy, sometimes contradictory historical processes in dialectical inter-
action that crystallise into a more easily perceptible whole at a particular his-
torical time and place” (162–63). For Tagg, none of this means that we should 
reject the 1800 hypothesis. On the contrary, the 1800 hypothesis simply means 
that around that time important changes took place.
In response to Strohm’s critique, Goehr points out that he risks lapsing 
into a Sorites Paradox, a type of little–by–little argument. By this she means 
that if one year cannot be enough for historical change to occur (because 
change is always “gradual”) then surely two years also cannot. But if two years 
cannot be enough then three years is also insufficient. From there, we enter an 
infinite regress in which no amount of time is sufficient for historical change. 
Thus, Strohm’s argument that saying “at this point” requires a demonstra-
tion of absolute newness would lead—by virtue of the Sorites Paradox—to 
the logical conclusion “that the work–concept existed from the first day of 
musical practice (whenever that was)” (Goehr 2000, 242). This conclusion, 
for anyone who believes that the work–concept is historically contingent, is 
patently absurd. The more reasonable position, Goehr believes, is therefore to 
propose a “rough” date for a concept’s emergence.
Still, a certain skepticism lingers. Why? Reflecting on The Imaginary 
Museum fifteen years after its publication, Goehr (2007, xxvii) writes: 
Even though I explicitly rejected the idea that the history of the work–con-
cept reflected a necessary, determinist, or essential development in music’s 
history, my thesis was interpreted not only as prioritizing the 1800 turning 
point to an excessive degree, but also as essentializing the concept according 
to this singular historical moment. 
Her words “to an excessive degree” perhaps betray more than they intend and 
belie a series of equivocations that run through her work. Consider, for exam-
ple, her later reflection that she did not “mean (and I thought this would have 
been obvious) to equate 1800 with a year, a month, a day, or an hour” (xxviii). 
The apparent innocence of this recollection is undermined by the sentence 
that directly follows it: “Saying this, however, I had better quickly add that 
neither did I think that ‘1800’ stood for all time.” In other words, 1800 does not 
designate a particular year, but it also does not designate “all time.” What, then, 
does it designate exactly? A decade? Two decades? With Goehr’s hastily added 
caveat to her “obvious” point that she did not intend to specify a particular 
year (or month or day or hour), the historiographical problems become clear 
and the critics of the “1800 hypothesis” begin to seem more reasonable.
This is why, to those critics who have argued for pushing the 1800 
hypothesis back in time and to those critics who have argued for push-
ing it forward, Goehr (2007, xxxiii) can only respond: “The challenge is 
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well motivated in both directions.”19 The question again, is just how well 
motivated and just how far back or forward. The entire discussion begins 
to seem like a game of cat and mouse. Hence, to Goehr’s observation 
that “[o]n the whole, musicologists recommended that I adopt a greater 
conceptual perspectivism regarding the work–concept, less, however, to 
undermine my thesis than to amplify it in a constructive way” (xxx), the 
question becomes: how much “perspectivism” can the central claim about 
work–concepts include before it becomes entirely meaningless?
Goehr’s answer, apparently, is not that much. Consider, for example, 
her response to Elaine Sisman’s quite reasonable request for more historical 
nuance, a request that might include something like the “opus–concept” 
alongside the work–concept. Goehr protests that honoring this request 
runs the risk of “unfurl[ing] into infinite speculation.”20 “Why not go fur-
ther,” she asks, “and add the composition–concept, the piece–concept, the 
oeuvre–concept, the tune–concept, the song–concept, the riff–concept, 
and even the improvisation–concept?” (Goehr 2007, xxxii). To this, I 
would respond: why not, indeed? Surely, this is precisely the kind of work 
that musicologists should be doing?21 And surely serious studies of the 
song–concept, for example, would only throw more (and not less) light 
on the work–concept, if only by clarifying what is particular to the both?
One final, related point is brought to light by Goehr’s response to 
Strohm’s admittedly brutal criticism of The Imaginary Museum. We have 
already recounted Strohm’s argument about the gradualness of historical 
change, an argument that Goehr refuted through recourse to the Sorites 
Paradox. Elsewhere, she writes:
It is less importantly the specific date of the concept’s emergence to 
which my thesis is committed than to the historical fact that the concept 
emerged, and with this at least Strohm has no disagreement. If works 
existed in 1450 and were named as such, then I am wrong as matter of 
fact. Still such an error would not undermine my claim that the work–
concept should not be assumed naturalistically or essentially to exist in 
all music practices or whatever sort. (Goehr 2007, xlviii)
This is precisely the kind of claim that is likely to irk historians of 
music, for Goehr tells us that her argument still stands even if it is off 
by 350 years! From a certain perspective her argument is indeed well 
taken: she means only that The Imaginary Museum was primarily targeted 
against those who believe that the work–concept is ahistorical and that, 
if Strohm agrees that the work–concept is historically contingent, then 
in some sense there is nothing more to argue about. Having said this, 
however, one may tolerate a difference of 50 or even 100 years—but 350? 
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Surely, the dedicated historian may argue, if a scholar’s argument can be 
off by 350 years and still be untouched then the argument itself must be 
rather weak?
This raises, once again, what I will call the “specter of nuance.” By this, 
I mean that although nuance may add to and enrich larger–scale and more 
general claims (such as the “1800 hypothesis”), it may also have the op-
posite effect, causing a “central claim” to expand so far that it ultimately 
collapses. From a certain perspective, the entire “intellectual history” of the 
work–concept may be summarized by placing scholars along a spectrum 
of generality (on the one hand) and nuance (on the other). Goehr makes 
general claims that admit only a limited amount of nuance and will there-
fore inevitably irk those wishing for more specificity. Sisman, to take an 
example representing the other extreme, insists on specificity, nuance, and 
plurality, and therefore simply cannot entertain “central claims” that are as 
far–reaching and generalizing as Goehr’s.
Of course, there is no way to decide which approach is better—it’s a 
matter, in the end, of what kind of scholarship one values, it is a matter of 
disciplinarity and perhaps even of taste. If this is true, then perhaps the only 
way to significantly contribute to the debate is to alter its fundamental terms. 
Allow me to emphasize that in my view changing the terms is the only way 
to contribute to the debate. There are certainly many ways to contribute 
to the history (or histories) of the musical work—for example, by doing 
meaningful historical and archival research, by studying the relationship 
between composers and performers, by looking at issues of copyright and 
fidelity, etc.. But none of these contributions, it seems to me, will ultimately 
add anything new to the theoretical debates surrounding the musical work.
As a pathway towards those larger theoretical questions, I turn to what 
has been perhaps the most contentious question in the intellectual history 
of the musical work: did Baroque composers compose musical works?
4. The Problematic of Musical Works During the Baroque Period
Several scholars have argued that the work–concept existed during the 
Baroque period, that is, fifty to one hundred and fifty years before 1800. 
According to James O. Young, for example, Goehr’s assertion that music 
before 1800 was constituted by its extra–musical function while music 
after 1800 has been defined in “aesthetic” (or absolute) terms is unten-
able. In making this argument, Young emphasizes the issue of “attention.” 
Presenting a very selective—and, I dare say, mildly distorted—reading of 
The Imaginary Museum, he asserts that Goehr’s argument revolves around 
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the assumption that before “the great divide” (Young’s term) “music was 
typically only one of several objects of attention.” Other objects of attention 
were extra–musical and included religion, eating, and dancing. As Young 
observes, Goehr argues that after 1800 music became the “exclusive focus 
of aesthetic attention,” particularly in the newly invented space of the con-
cert hall (Young 2005, 175).
Although the general outline of Young’s reading is not inaccurate per 
se, it is difficult to understand why he limits his discussion to the issue 
of attention, as though this alone can explain the complexities of Goehr’s 
history of the musical work. In any event, having reduced Goehr’s work 
thusly, Young immediately attempts to prove that she was wrong. His argu-
ment, in essence, is that it is possible to provide counter–examples. “While 
evidence can be marshaled for the great divide hypothesis,” he writes, 
“evidence against it is also available.” He then proceeds to illustrate that 
even after 1800 some people continued to divide their attention between 
“music” and other things. Furthermore, by drawing on a few examples 
from documentation about Handel, he asserts that before 1800 people did 
occasionally listen “attentively” (Young 2005, 177).
Young, in brief, offers a common rebuttal by providing counter–ex-
amples on either side of the “divide.” I leave it to scholars more qualified 
than myself to evaluate whether or not one can say with any certainly that 
Handel’s audience listened attentively. (It is easy to verify his other claim: 
indeed, post–1800 listeners do not always listen attentively.) But I think 
a more important question is what we gain from a series of counter–ex-
amples, even if they are accurate and numerous. What exactly is gained by 
shifting the “1800 hypothesis” back by fifty years, resulting in the “1750 
hypothesis”?22
A similar question could be asked of Dyck (2010, 6), who rebuts the 
1800 hypothesis by arguing, in part, that Goehr’s claim that musical works 
are created only by “independent masters and creators of their art” is re-
futed by the “fact” that many Baroque composers owned their music. To 
be fair, this is only one small part of Dyck’s massive refutation of Goehr’s 
work, in which he attacks the Professor from all angles—philosophical, 
historical, cultural, etc.. But with regard to the issue of “independent mas-
ters” Dyck’s only response is that 1800 is too late. To this, I would ask again 
what the value of such a refutation is.
There are, however, other critiques of Goehr that consist of more than 
simply providing Baroque examples of things that look like works. Harry 
White’s work stands out in this regard; I will therefore consider it carefully. 
At first blush, White’s critique does not seem to differ substantially from 
other Baroque scholars, since he too hones in on one aspect of Goehr’s 
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work in order to rebut it: where Young focuses on attention and Dyck on 
ownership, White emphasizes “textual integrity.” Indeed, he refers to “the 
concept of textual integrity [that] only becomes paramount in the wake of 
Beethoven’s achievement” as Goehr’s “central claim” (White 1997, 96). (We 
have seen already that Goehr’s central claim is much more—and perhaps 
also much less—than this, and that for her the musical work is not reduc-
ible to its score, even though it is closely associated with it. But let this 
point not detain us.)
Like Young and Dyck, White wants to argue that works existed already 
during the Baroque period. He also—like his two peers—does this through 
counter–examples. But his argument is of a different order. Rather than 
accepting Goehr’s definition of the musical work and then showing that it 
is applicable before 1800, White (1997, 96) presents the unusual argument 
that Goehr has paid insufficient attention to “the music itself.” “No–one 
can usefully deny that [J.S.] Bach’s cantatas were more immediately inden-
tured to social function than the keyboard compositions of Beethoven,” 
he writes, “but this does not mean that Wachet auf, ruft uns die Stimme is 
less emancipated in musical terms than the ‘Waldstein’ sonata. To suggest 
otherwise, as Goehr does, is to mistake the social function of music for its 
meaning” (100). At first glance, White’s argument seems fairly reaction-
ary: after all, what is music’s “meaning” outside of its “social function”? To 
discern musical meaning outside of social function, in other words, seems 
at first rather conservative and smacks of pre–New Musicological ideology. 
But on closer inspection it is evident that White has something slightly 
different in mind. Substituting the “work–concept” with the “authority–
concept,” he refers to the “periodic censure which Bach’s art induced.” That 
Bach was the authority of his own music is borne out by the “gulf which 
lay between his duties as a Kapellmeister–composer and the insistent origi-
nality and extremism of his music.” White writes: “Bach stringently tested 
the norms of the authority–concept (which in Leipzig derived from the 
canons of orthodox Lutheranism) to the point where they were habitually 
overtaken by the autonomous signatures of his art” (103). Seen this way, 
White’s point is not so much that we ought to understand Bach’s music “in 
itself,” but rather that Bach himself actively resisted the social pressures of 
his day by composing music that was more stylistically extreme than was 
expected of him.
I have spent a substantial amount of time on White (1997, 103) because 
of the conclusion that he reaches: “[I]t is the work itself,” he says, “and not 
the presence or absence of explicit verbal recognition—which argues the 
existence of a transcendent concept of artistic autonomy.” In other words, 
unlike Young and Dyck who simply push the work–concept back fifty or 
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one hundred years, White proposes that although Baroque composers such 
as Bach wrote musical works, they themselves did not recognize their com-
positions as such.23 This is a heterodox argument and differs substantially 
from arguments by other Baroque scholars. White’s assertion also raises an 
issue that lies at the crux of this paper: can one say that Bach wrote works 
if he did not (and was not able) to recognize them as works?
5. On Regulative Concepts
How, then, do we answer the question, “Did Bach compose musical works?” 
Goehr’s response is actually far more radical than is usually assumed. She 
writes: “Bach did not intend to compose musical works” (Goehr 2007, 8). 
Although not emphasized in The Imaginary Museum, in her new introduc-
tion to the second edition Goehr foregrounds the word “intend” (xlii).24 But 
this does not solve any problems, for it still does not answer the following 
questions: Did Bach compose musical works? Could Bach have composed 
musical works if he did not intend to? What, precisely, does intention mean 
in this context?
In order to understand this wrinkle—a wrinkle, I would argue, that 
changes everything—it is necessary to consider the notion of the regulative 
concept. After all, Goehr is emphatic that Bach’s compositions were not 
regulated by the work–concept. The question is only whether, if he had no 
work–concept, he necessarily also had no works.
Borrowed rather loosely from Immanuel Kant, Goehr uses the term 
“regulative concept” to denote the “as if ” structure of musical works. When 
the regulative concept of a musical work is operative, she argues, then 
works are “treated as if they were givens and not ‘merely’ concepts that 
have artificially emerged and crystallized within practice” (Goehr 2007, 
104; emphasis mine). In other words, a regulative concept is a concept that 
functions as if it is not a concept.
Strohm takes issue with Goehr’s appropriation of this Kantian term, 
arguing that for Kant the distinction between constitutive and regulative 
concepts is not amenable to historical considerations. As such, “Kant 
would reject outright the hypothesis of a historical development from a 
constitutive to a regulative idea” (Strohm 2000, 144). This faithful reading 
of Kant forms the basis of Strohm’s third “thesis”: 
Philosophical concepts, and in particular the notion of a “regulative use 
of transcendental ideas” (Kant), are not suited to make up the criteria of 
historical chronology. The identification itself of the musical work–con-
cept with one of these regulative [uses of] ideas is spurious. (151)
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In her response to Strohm, Goehr recalls that when writing The Imaginary 
Museum she did not intend to suggest that regulative concepts followed from 
constitutive concepts, nor was she particularly invested in a strict application 
of Kant.25 Her intentions, it seems, were both more modest and less rigorous: 
“I wanted merely to capture,” she recalls, “how, around 1800, the musical 
work–concept became the concept that regulated—dictated or governed—
the terms of musical practice” (Goehr 2000, 240).
Before 1800, Goehr insists, music was not regulated by the work–concept. 
Since roughly 1800, however, it has been common to speak anachronistically 
of pre–1800 compositions as works. It has been common, in other words, to 
“retroactively impose upon this music concepts developed at a later point 
in the history of music” (Goehr 2007, 115). Which returns us, finally, to the 
question of whether Bach composed musical works. It seems to me that a la-
tent answer is discernable in The Imaginary Museum, although Goehr herself 
does not articulate that answer fully. Let us follow her argument carefully.
According to Goehr, only after 1800 could people conceive the music 
that they produced (or spoke about, or thought about) in terms of works. 
In other words, only after 1800 did the work–concept become regulative. 
But this does not mean, she emphasizes, that Baroque composers did not 
produce works. Nonetheless, although she insists that it does not mean that 
Baroque composers did not produce works, she has difficulty saying out-
right that Baroque composers did compose works. “Maybe Bach composed 
works,” she writes, “even though he explicitly thought about music in differ-
ent conceptual terms.” She continues: “That may be so, but it is not so in any 
straightforward sense” (Goehr 2007, 115; emphasis mine).
Goehr then seems to pull back somewhat, asking: “Can a concept have, 
in fact, a form of existence, namely implicit existence, over and above explicit 
existence?” (emphasis mine). Without actually answering the question, she 
retreats to a much easier point: 
Ignoring the impending logical complexities [of whether a concept can 
have a form of existence over and above explicit existence], I am interested 
above all in resisting the inclination to say that the work–concept must 
always have functioned in some matter. (Goehr 2007, 114) 
Certainly, but we already knew that the work–concept has not always func-
tioned, the question now is whether before the work–concept composers 
were able to compose works—and this is a question that Goehr seems to 
continually avoid.
Still, she returns to the question of whether Baroque composers might 
have composed works, asking whether they may have had some kind of 
“implicit” understanding. Her answer to this is very interesting. She says that 
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from an epistemological standpoint concepts become explicit first, that 
is, before their chronologically prior implicitness can be detected: “Only 
with its explicit function realized can we in hindsight see the concept 
as functioning implicitly” (Goehr 2007, 114). Hence, only after the full 
and explicit development of the work–concept after 1800 could anyone 
ever say that Bach implicitly composed works. In fact, she suggests that 
if the work–concept had never emerged at all (something entirely pos-
sible in her view) then no one would ever have been able to say that 
Bach composed musical works in any manner at all, even implicitly.
Commenting on her 1992 proclamation that “Bach did not intend 
to create musical works,” she writes:
Contrary to how this line has too often been read, I did not say Bach 
did not compose musical works, only that he had not intended to 
compose them. I certainly did not say what I have most recently been 
accused of saying, that “there were no true musical works before 1800” 
(whatever this sentence actually means). The word “intend” was to 
serve as a placeholder for the idea that when Bach was composing his 
extraordinarily great music, he was able to think of its production, 
performance, and reception in terms different from those associated 
with work–production. (Goehr 2007, xlii)
Notice that Goehr forecloses the question of whether Bach composed 
musical works—when it comes to the question of whether there were 
or were not musical works before 1800 she appends the parenthetical 
clause “whatever this sentence actually means.” A similar sentence ap-
pears, in fact, in The Imaginary Museum, where she writes: “Prior to its 
explicit emergence, there is no evidence to suggest that persons were 
really (whatever that means) thinking about something in conceptual 
terms distinct from those indicated by their expressed thought and be-
havior” (Goehr 2007, 114; emphasis in the original). In brief, the ques-
tion of whether people were really thinking in terms of musical works 
(although they were not doing so explicitly) is considered meaningless.
In her later reflections, Goehr writes that the question of whether 
or not Bach composed works has everything to do with the relationship 
between concepts and objects. “I now think,” she writes, 
the problems in shifting between these two ways of talking are prob-
ably insurmountable, and therefore irreconcilable. In The Imaginary 
Museum, I kept my claims as best I could at the level of concepts, 
precisely because this left open the decision as to whether with or 




Here, Goehr states explicitly that the question of whether Bach composed 
musical works is aporetic. We can speak only of the musical work as a concept, 
and as a concept the musical work (that is, the “work–concept”) emerged after 
1800. As an object, we can say nothing whatsoever about the musical work.
6. Recapitulation and Elaboration of the Main Argument
In the final analysis, Goehr’s writings take us very far but leave us with two 
fairly substantial “problems.” First, they tell us little about how we might be 
able to think about works before the work–concept. Recall that for Goehr 
only after the full and explicit development of the work–concept after 1800 
could anyone ever say that Bach implicitly composed works. But what kinds 
of music are implicitly works? What kinds of music have the “potential” to 
become works? Is Bach’s music any more implicitly work–like than anything 
else? It seems that Goehr forecloses any discussion on this topic because, as 
she says, she does not deal with objects—she deals only with concepts (and 
Bach had no work–concept).27
The second “problem” that needs to be addressed is that Goehr presumes 
a particular form of retroactive—or even “teleological”—historiography in 
her work. Because teleological historiography is completely anathema to the 
vast majority of historical musicologists, few who have responded to The 
Imaginary Museum have said anything about this issue at all.28 It seems to me, 
however, that Goehr’s argument can only be fully understood by radicalizing 
teleogical history, and not by shying away from it. To do this requires a com-
plete re–thinking of how history has been practiced by music historians in 
the past thirty or so years and it requires, moreover, resuscitating teleological 
historiography without falling into the many traps that haunt that mode of 
understanding history.
So, let us leave aside the extant debates surrounding the musical work 
for a moment and look elsewhere. In what follows, I radicalize and sharpen 
the notion of retroactive history by turning back to the relationship between 
the history of the musical work and a certain history of economics, outlined 
in the introduction to this essay. To recall my earlier argument: I suggested 
that the advent of the musical work marks the point at which the relation-
ship between performance and score is inverted. But as Yuran observes, it is 
impossible to locate this point. Although there may “be points in time when 
people acknowledge…that a change has already taken place,” this “posterior 
recognition implies that a real change has already” taken place. In brief, “The 
only possible temporality of this change is of that which has already happened” 
(Yuran 2014, 133–34; emphasis in the original).
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How, then, might one theorize this peculiar temporality? One answer to 
the enigmatic question about when the shift from performance (supported 
by a score) to score (supported by performance) took place is to say that it 
had “been so all along”: from the moment of inscription, that inscription 
had already replaced performance.29 But this argument is false based on his-
torical evidence, since people initially acted as if the score supported a more 
fundamental performance.30
This leads us to ask when the real shift occurred? Yuran offers us an in-
genious solution to the riddle. “[T]he real change,” he says, “is nothing but the 
posterior recognition that the change had already occurred” (emphasis mine). 
For this paradoxical idea to be meaningful it is necessary to understand rec-
ognition as itself eminently historical. As Yuran says: “recognition itself is 
viewed not only as a recognition of a historical fact (that money is not X but 
Y) but is viewed as a historical event” (2014, 134). The consequence of this 
idea is that recognition actually changes the status of the thing that it recog-
nizes (money, music). In the first instance, “material” money (that is, money 
wherein the material substance is supported by a symbol) was constituted 
through misrecognition: “it was thought to be material but it was even then 
already symbolic. Therefore when the posterior recognition complements 
this missing knowledge, money necessarily changes: it can no longer depend 
on this specific non–knowledge” (Yuran 2009, 145).
The same can be said of musical works. Even when, initially and at the 
earliest stages of musical notation, scores supported performances it would 
have been possible to say—although it was not said—that performances 
supported scores, or that performances were instantiations of works. The 
“real” changes takes place, not when performances “actually” begin to sup-
port works (because, in a sense, this has always already happened since the 
moment of inscription) but with the recognition that at some prior time 
performances had begun supporting works.
It therefore seems that a historical investigation of musical works might 
benefit from reckoning with the notion of posterior recognition, that is to say, 
of hindsight. Historical knowledge is not reducible to a belated perspective 
on a stable object. Rather, historical knowledge—that is to say, that mode of 
thought defined by hindsight—is actually constitutive of historical objects.
This approach goes quite far towards “solving” some of the problems of 
the history of the musical work. It illustrates, for example, why it is so dif-
ficult to determine precisely when the musical work emerged. Furthermore, 
it sheds light on some of the more opaque aspects of Goehr’s argument. But 
advocating a retroactive history based on hindsight also harbors certain 
dangers. It is therefore necessary to more carefully examine what Yuran 
(2014, 206) terms the “ontological status of the advantage of hindsight.”
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7. Hindsight, Teleology, and Historiography
As Yuran suggests, hindsight implies the affirmation of a certain 
form of teleology.31 But surely, the reader may protest, nothing could 
be worse? In fact, what united so–called New Musicologists of many 
stripes was a total disdain for teleological history, to the extent that 
the “messy” contingency of history has become something of a truism 
in music studies for the past two or more decades. Certainly, there 
were many good reasons for launching an assault on teleological his-
toriography, not least of which are its often pernicious, Eurocentric, 
and “phallogocentric” connotations. After all, what else is teleology 
than the (false) idea of Great Men who progress steadily in history 
towards Enlightenment and control over other people and over the 
entire world itself?
With the advent of the New Musicology, then, teleological histori-
ography was seemingly banished forever. Already in the 1980s, Joseph 
Kerman (1985, 106) spoke derisively about the “heretofore accepted 
expectation by the Western historical consciousness of stylistic growth, 
development, progress, and teleology.” And in the years and decades 
that followed musicologists, music theorists, and ethnomusicologists 
all had something to say about teleology.32 Although these pointed 
responses reflected a larger intellectual and cultural shift and were 
not unique to music studies, musicologists often pointed to homol-
ogy between teleological historiography and one of Western music’s 
sacred cows: tonality. With characteristic insight and virtuosity, Susan 
McClary famously illustrated in numerous texts that teleology haunts 
not only historical discourse about music but also the very experience 
of Western music itself. So, for example, in her analysis of the first 
movement of J.S. Bach’s Brandenberg Concerto No. 5, she begins by 
drawing our attention to the piece’s “complex harmonic syntax that 
continually implies what the next cadence in the background ought 
to be—while deferring the actual arrival until the composer sees fit 
to produce it.” She then writes that “[t]his process is intensely teleo-
logical in that it draws its power from its ability to make the listener 
desire and finally experience the achievement—usually after much 
postponed gratification—of predetermined goals” (emphasis mine). 
This musical logic, she suggests, expresses the “social values” of the 
middle–class, namely “beliefs in progress, in expansion, in the ability 
to attain ultimate goals through rational striving, in the ingenuity of 
the individual strategist operating both within and in defiance of the 
norm” (McClary 1987, 22).
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Musicologists have thus critiqued “teleological” processes both 
within music and in histories and contexts external to it. And of 
course, if we take teleology (only) to mean beliefs in progress, expan-
sion, rational attainment of goals, and individual strategies, then cer-
tainly there is reason for concern. Yuran likewise fully acknowledges 
the problems with (certain kinds of) teleology, observing for example 
that teleology “is unacceptable today, among other reasons, because 
of the religious overtones associated with it.”33 Furthermore, he says, 
teleology often “hints at an all–knowing observer of history or at an 
a–historical entity holding the telos of history” (Yuran 2014, 207).34
Nonetheless, it is also possible to discern certain advantages to a 
teleological view of history—at least if one radically transforms how this 
teleology functions. For one thing, says Yuran (2009, 112), “eradicating 
any effect of retroactivity eliminates the uniqueness of historical knowl-
edge.”35 Elsewhere, he continues: 
Limiting oneself to recording events as they were “contemporaneously 
perceived” amounts to effacing the specific historicity of the past. It 
renders the “pastness” of the past, its position in time, a coincidental, 
external fact. It makes the past a sort of a present that only coinciden-
tally is positioned in another time. (Yuran 2014, 205)36
Yuran then suggests that hindsight, by contrast, is perhaps what con-
stitutes historical knowledge qua historical knowledge, or to put things 
another way, what makes historical knowledge a unique form of knowl-
edge unlike any other. Following this suggestion, he can only lament 
that “[t]he price for this theoretical achievement is a certain necessary 
element of teleological form” (Yuran 2009, 112). In other words, to think 
history qua history one must admit a certain strain of teleology.
Of course, there are other ways to write history that avoid presenting 
“the past as a sort of a present that only coincidentally is positioned in 
another time.” Gary Tomlinson’s Foucauldian histories of Renaissance 
music (1993) and of opera over the past few centuries (1999) are exem-
plary in this regard. Tomlinson argues, for example, that between the 
Renaissance era and the “classical” age there was a shift in the conditions 
of possibility for knowledge that constrained and enabled different forms 
of expressivity, musical practice, and thought. In this Foucauldian view, 
history is marked by radical ruptures to the extent that we cannot ever 
fully know, for example, what the relationship between music and magic 
meant to Renaissance authors and composers.37 Thus, although I propose 
a specific form of teleology in this article, I do not mean to suggest that 
this is the only historiographical model available.
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Other recent musicological interventions arguably avoid the trap that 
Yuran finds in non–teleological histories, while simultaneously offering 
other insights. Of particular interest are interventions that challenge ex-
cessively anthropocentric historiography. It may be worthwhile, here, to 
clearly articulate how Yuran’s historical materialist position differs from 
an approach such as actor–network theory.
A good place to start is Benjamin Piekut’s (2014, 19) excellent article, 
“Actor–Networks in Music History: Clarifications and Critiques,” which 
follows Bruno Latour’s call for a “renewed empiricism that does not 
merely report facts based on evidence, but instead accounts for the mul-
tifarious labourers (human and not) that make something true but open 
to revision.” From the vantage point of a renewed empiricism, privileging 
the work–concept in histories of classical and romantic music is prob-
lematic on both theoretical and political grounds. As Piekut suggests, 
“those who take [the] work concept for granted, simply ignore the many 
historical, social, and material mediations that occur whenever music is 
performed” (18–19).
Piekut (2014, 18) argues that the work–concept “denies music’s mate-
rial and social forms” and that it does not “constitute an ontology.” The 
work–concept, he says, is just that—a “concept that emerges historically 
and that eventually regulates musical practice and discourse” (ibid.; em-
phasis in the original). Thus, one aim of historiography is “adding back” 
overlooked mediators into historical accounts (19; emphasis mine; see 
also Piekut 2011). In the case of the musical work, this might mean 
looking beyond works and including discussions of performers, concert 
spaces, and instruments.38
While Piekut’s historiographical model offers an important alterna-
tive, it is useful to recall that Goehr had already suggested a different way 
to understand the word “concept.” For Goehr, concepts are not “merely” 
human ideas. When the work–concept became operative around 1800, 
she argues, musical works were “treated as if they were givens and not 
‘merely’ concepts that have artificially emerged and crystallized within 
practice” (Goehr 2007, 104).
Goehr’s argument once again directly parallels Yuran’s analysis of 
money. For Yuran, it is too simple to say that money has value only be-
cause people believe that it does. Money functions rather as disavowal: 
even though individuals know that money is just a useless piece of paper, 
they act as if it has value. But Yuran also goes further, drawing out the on-
tological implications of this “as if ” structure. Based on the observation 
that money functions as money whether you—as an individual—believe 
in its value or not, he suggests that money is a concept that “confronts 
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the subject in the shape of [an] external object” (Yuran 2014, 56; emphasis 
mine). Money is therefore a peculiar or even uncanny type of concept: 
it is an objective concept, or what Sohn–Rethel (1978) would call a “real 
abstraction.”
As a historical materialist, then, Yuran is not interested in “adding 
back” overlooked actors into an account of economic history. Instead, he 
focuses his attention on the manner by which social reality assumes the 
form of an external object.39 To summarize: for the historical materialist, 
a “historical object” is not an “object from the past.” Rather, a historical 
object is an object penetrated and shaped by history.40
My aim is not to advocate historical materialism over actor–network 
theory. Nor do I believe that Yuran’s analysis obviates the need for alterna-
tive historiographical models. One might easily point, in fact, to certain 
limitations of historical materialism—at least as it is theorized by late 
twentieth–century Lacanian Marxists such as Yuran. There is something 
troubling, for example, about the conflation of social reality with reality 
all told. Furthermore, it would be difficult to see how a rigidly histori-
cal materialist position would adequately deal with certain practices of 
non–Western sound production, such as those of certain Amerindian 
groups who subscribe to a multinaturalist ontology (Ochoa Gautier 
2014). Nonetheless, the mode of historical investigation that Yuran de-
velops remains useful for a historical analysis of the musical work, in part 
because this construct is deeply embedded within Western modernity. 
As this paper has shown, debates regarding the history of the musical 
work have long been stuck in a cul–de–sac. If nothing else, Yuran’s work 
provides us with one possible way out.
8. Solving the Riddle of The Musical Work—In Hindsight
I conclude by returning to Lydia Goehr’s The Imaginary Museum of Musical 
Works and by considering what is perhaps the most complex (and polemi-
cal) passage in that book: 
Now we can make sense of the basic argument lying behind my central 
claim that prior to 1800 (or thereabouts), musicians did not function 
under the regulation of the work–concept. To be sure, they functioned 
with concepts of opera, cantata, sonata, and symphony, but that does not 
mean they were producing works. It was only later when the production 
of music began to be conceived along work–based principles that early 
operas, cantatas, symphonies, and sonatas acquired their status as dif-
ferent kinds of musical work. And this is why we can meaningfully say, 
nowadays, that Bach composed musical works. (Goehr 2007, 115)
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This statement has usually been understood to mean that nowadays 
Bach’s compositions may be considered works for us. Or, stated another 
way, that today we “conceptualize” Bach’s compositions as works—per-
forming them at concerts as works, analyzing them as works, etc.—even 
though during Bach’s time people did not conceive them as such. Indeed, 
this is perhaps what Goehr had in mind.
But there is also a way to radicalize her statement that “we can mean-
ingfully say, nowadays, that Bach composed musical works.” I propose that 
we understand this statement to mean that even though Bach did not com-
pose musical works in his own time, today we can say retroactively that 
Bach did compose musical works. Note well: the point is not—or at least, 
not only—that in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries we can 
treat Bach’s “pieces” as works, for example, by performing them outside of 
a religious context and standardizing previously improvisatory parts and 
sections. (After all, it would be possible to do this with any music at all. For 
example, one could turn bebop recordings into musical works by standard-
izing them, transcribing them, and canonizing them.) The point is rather 
that today we can say that Bach composed musical works in his own time: 
although in his own time Bach did not compose musical works, today we 
can say (or after 1800 people have been able to say) that Bach did compose 
musical works in his own time. In this view, history itself has changed—in 
hindsight, we determine something about a historical moment that did not 
“exist” at that moment.
It is possible to make a similar argument by pointing to Goehr’s distinc-
tion between emergence and origination. Her claim has always been “that 
the work–concept emerged with its full regulative force around 1800” and 
she has always “avoid[ed] the assumption that the concept originated then.” 
Her claim allows for the possibility that the origin of the work–concept can 
be found in “periods long before” 1800, but it also emphasizes that those 
origins can only be identified after the full development of the concept 
(Goehr 2000, 238). This claim—which is already somewhat heterodox—
receives its full force when we acknowledge that the work–concept was not 
an inevitable development of history and that it may, under different con-
ditions, never have emerged at all.41 If this is so, then the full development 
of the work–concept does not only allow for the identification of its origins 
in times prior to 1800; in a sense, the development of the work–concept 
actually creates its origins.
Certainly, the mode of historiography I have proposed in this paper 
does not solve everything. It does not, for example, help us to understand 
pre–1800 music “on its own (contemporary) terms.” But neither does it 
foreclose any discussion of pre–1800 music in the way that Goehr pre-
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scribes. Instead, it provides an unequivocal answer to the question of 
whether Bach composed musical works: he did. But Bach only composed 
musical works “because” of a regulative work–concept that fully developed 
after Bach’s own death. Bach, of course, also composed cantatas, oratorios, 
and concerti. Today, we can say that Bach composed works as well.
Notes
1. I would like to thank Roger Grant, David Gutkin, and Emily Zazulia for feedback and 
conversations about earlier drafts of this article. Many thanks also to Thomas Fogg and to 
an anonymous reader for helpful comments.
2. Goehr’s The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music 
was first published in 1992 by Oxford University Press. (In the UK, the book was printed by 
Clarendon, an imprint of Oxford University Press.) As Richard Taruskin (2007, v) points 
out in his forward to the 2007 revised edition, judging by the high price of the first edition 
“Oxford University Press was evidently counting on selling out a tiny press run to librar-
ies.” Nonetheless, a paperback edition followed in 1994 and in 2007 Oxford issued a revised 
edition including the forward by Taruskin just mentioned as well as a lengthy new intro-
ductory essay by Goehr titled “His Master’s Choice.” I will hereafter refer to The Imaginary 
Museum of Musical Works simply as The Imaginary Museum. All references, unless other-
wise stated, are to the 2007 edition. In addition to being the subject of numerous book re-
views and articles (many of these will be referenced below), The Imaginary Museum was the 
theme of an important symposium held at the University of Liverpool in 1998. Proceedings 
from the symposium were later published as The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?, and 
edited by Michael Talbot (2000). This collection contains numerous responses to Goehr’s 
The Imaginary Museum and includes an important debate between Reinhard Strohm and 
Lydia Goehr.
3. Texts that explicitly argue for the emergence of the work–concept during the Baroque in-
clude White 1997; Erauw 1998; and Young 2005. German scholars have long located the ad-
vent of the work–concept in Nicolai Listenius’s (1549) Musica: Ab authore denuo recognita 
multisque novis regulis et exemplis adaucta. See, for example, Wiora 1983 and Seidel 1987. 
(For Goehr’s discussion of Listenius in The Imaginary Museum, see 115–19.) Probably the 
most sustained recent text to argue for Listenius as the key developer of the work–concept 
is Perkins 2003.
4. Here, I am only referring to those who locate the advent of the work–concept at the very 
beginning of music writing in the West. See, for example, Perkins 2003.
5. I return to the debate surrounding Bach at great length later in this paper and therefore 
will refrain from citing the various relevant sources here.
6. That this is the case largely due to the labors of Lydia Goehr.
7. At this point in the paper (since the main terms of debate have not yet been fully explicat-
ed), I use the terms “work” and “work–concept” somewhat loosely. As I show later, however, 
the conceptualization of the musical work was a key moment in its history.
8. It would be entirely possible, on the other hand, to draw more concrete connections. 
Richard Middleton (2000, 84) writes, for example: “It can hardly be accidental that the rise 
of the ‘work’ parallels and intermeshes with that of the ‘commodity,’ nor that the history of 
that sort of ‘individuality’ necessary to the former coincides with that of capitalism, whose 
success was powered, as the work of Weber and Tawney gives us good reason to believe, 
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by exactly the same species of property–conscious individualism. Fetishism of the work 
is not too far away from the fetishism of the commodity to which Marx drew attention, 
both in its characteristic psychology and in its social basis in the effacement of collective 
labour. Goehr attributes the success of work thinking to ‘conceptual imperialism,’ but it 
becomes easier to understand the political power that concepts can undoubtedly possess 
if we grasp the material forces in which they are rooted and which they help to sustain.” 
For important examination of the relationship between the musical work and the com-
modity form, see also Adorno 1997. As an aside, note that Jacques Attali (1986) points 
to inversions similar to the ones I have mentioned here in his famous book, Noise: The 
Political Economy of Music. See, for example, his observation that although recording was 
first “produced as a way of preserving its trace, it instead replaced it as the driving force 
of the economy of music” (85).
9. The quote from Smith can be found in Yuran 2014, 132. The following argument draws 
heavily on Yuran’s work.
10. Fiat money refers to money declared as legitimate by a formal institution, usually a 
state.
11. I hasten to reiterate that I am not attempting to valorize or celebrate this inversion. 
Furthermore, I am fully aware that many musicians and musicologists alike would balk at 
the idea that performance is secondary to a score or work. Indeed, we are currently wit-
nessing a political, aesthetic, an ontological move away from the work–concept, a move 
spurred by increased dialogue with popular and non–Western musics. Having said this, I 
believe it difficult to deny the hegemonic view, at least within “classical” music, that works 
are prioritized over performances.
12. I do not mean to suggest that all “philosophical” ruminations of the musical work are 
useless or without merit. In fact, I believe that we need in a way to revive a more philo-
sophical approach if the discourse is to move forward. Furthermore, it would be naïve to 
think that purely philosophical approaches to musical work are a thing of the past. On 
the contrary, such approaches are still frequently published in philosophy journals. The 
divide, then, is disciplinary. And because Goehr works closely in both philosophical and 
musicological communities she is forced to confront critics from both sides of the divide 
constantly.
13. See especially Chapter 4, “The Central Claim.”
14. Goehr borrows this term loosely from André Malraux’s (1978) “Museum without 
Walls.” See Goehr 2007, 173.
15. Perkins (2003, 16) seems to suggest as much: “And although it may be stating the obvi-
ous, I would also suggest that the emergence of the work–concept was intimately linked 
from the outset with the development of a uniquely European historical phenomenon: an 
increasing reliance on musical notation for the study and performance of music.” Perkins 
seems to equate the existence of the musical work with music’s being “fixed.” In making 
this argument, he draws on Sean Gallagher’s (2000) account of music’s becoming a “tex-
tually stable object” (as cited in Perkins 2003, 27–28). Similarly, Talbot (2000, 6) seems 
to agree that for music after 1800 “the work is its score tout court.” By contrast, Wegman 
(1996, 433) states succinctly about the late eighteenth century: “Writing, as such, was not 
a defining criterion in this aesthetic: the latter centered on the composer’s ‘idea,’ without 
which a counterpoint exercise, despite being written, could not aspire to the cultural sta-
tus that composition then enjoyed.”
16. Goehr borrows the term “ontological mutants” from Tormey (1974, 207).
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17. The relationship between works, scores, and performances is clearly extremely com-
plex. Here, it may be useful to add one additional remark, namely that scores are not 
merely “hypostasized” works but are in fact necessary for the very existence of works. 
Why is this the case? It is so because even though musical works may be meaningful-
ly understood as the “permanently existing creations of composers” that are irreduc-
ible to scores and performances, they nonetheless require a score, or a performance, or 
some other material supplement in order to continue existing. For example, although 
Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony (to use Goehr’s favorite example) is not reducible to, or iden-
tical with, any possible score or performance, it would be difficult to say that this work 
still exists if every material trace of its existence is demolished. By “every material trace,” 
I include not only scores and performances but also recordings and even the minds and 
bodies of those who remember the piece enough to reconstruct it in the event that all 
scores somehow disappear. My point, in short, is that although a musical work is not 
reducible to any or all of its material supplements, each work requires the existence of 
at least one material supplement to continue existing. This means that the “imaginary” 
museum of musical works—although imaginary—cannot only be imaginary. Or, to state 
things another way, although the works themselves are “imaginary” they require material 
supplements that are not.
18. This central ambiguity of aesthetic theory has more recently been explored by Jacques 
Rancière (e.g. 2004, 2009). See also Moreno and Steingo 2012.
19. The full text reads: “Several critics have argued that something more or less like the 
work–concept was present not only around 1800 but also around 1700—or is it 1600, 
1500, 1400, or 1300? Others, looking in the opposite direction, have said that if we take 
the standardization of the work–concept seriously into account, then instead of focusing 
on 1800 one ought to focus on 1900 with the onset, say, of ‘high fidelity’ recording. The 
challenge is well motivated in both directions” (Goehr 2007, xxxiii).
20. Here, Goehr is responding to a public discussion between Sisman and George Lewis. 
Shortly after the appearance of the revised edition of The Imaginary Museum of Musical 
Works, Sisman published a fuller critique of Goehr’s work, a critique that presumably re-
sembles her earlier remarks from the conversation with Lewis. See Sisman 2008, 79–107. 
For Sisman’s critique of Goehr, see especially 80–81. “That Goehr’s book has had such 
wide effect,” writes Sisman, “is based partly on the clarity of its ‘central claim’ and the 
memorable date 1800, partly on the fact that the combination of Romantic music aesthet-
ics and the works of Beethoven did wreak a substantial change of some kind, and partly 
on the easy critique it allows of the European classical canon (its reification, its hegemony, 
it eliteness, its composer–centeredness, its claims to autonomy, its museum–like concert 
halls, its text–based inflexibility, its masterpiece worship)” (81n4). According to Sisman, 
The Imaginary Museum is “based on a problematic understanding of the eighteenth cen-
tury and a backdating of the idea of Werktreue . . .” Sisman argues that Goehr’s “mis-
reading of the evidence conflates and obscures publishing practice, composer intention, 
ontological status, performance traditions, and reception” (81).
21. Rob Wegman’s (1996) study of a composer–centered musical concept in the Renais-
sance is exemplary in this regard. Focusing on the opposition between improvisation 
and composition, Wegman tells us even in the Renaissance period “the composer is seen 
to exercise authorial control over his work—evidently a projection of the humanist ide-
als of textual integrity, faithfulness to the original, and the related concern to remove 
nonauthorial ‘corruptions’” (468). Around 1500, the definition of the composer becomes 
more clearly defined, and with it the distinction between the “composition as object” and 
improvisatory practice (477). In a footnote, Wegman seems to suggest that something re-
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sembling the work–concept (as described by Goehr) was present in the sixteenth century. 
About the fifteenth century, he says only that “concept of the musical work is much more 
problematic” (433n69).
22. Note well: I am not saying that there is no value in revising the date of the work–con-
cept. Indeed, there may be major musicological implications in doing this. Furthermore, 
precision is inherently valuable to any historian. My concern is only that offering up coun-
ter–examples (especially in the region of fifty years) to what may otherwise be a major 
historical statement is perhaps not very productive.
23. Dyck (2010) actually also addresses the issue of recognition. I leave his argument aside 
in this article, but direct the reader to 62–76 of his essay.
24. I return to the key sentence in question later in this section: “Contrary to how this line 
has too often been read, I did not say Bach did not compose musical works, only that he 
had not intended to compose them” (Goehr 2007, xlii).
25. Goehr (2000, 240) includes the following parenthetical remark: “(I was influenced, 
rather, by Rawls’ adaptation of Kant).” In The Imaginary Museum, she writes in a footnote: 
“I have benefited from J. Rawls ‘Two Concepts of Rules,’ Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 
3–32, and Tormey’s ‘Indeterminacy and Identity in Art,’ 210” (Goehr 2007, 102n22). It is 
interesting to note that in his Philosophical Review article, Rawls (1955) mentions neither 
Kant nor regulative concepts. In fact, his later work seems far more relevant. For example, 
he writes in A Theory of Justice: “Now let us say that a society is well–ordered when it is not 
only designed to advance the good for its members but when it is also effectively regulated 
by a public conception of justice” (1971, 4–5; emphasis mine). For Rawls, the principles 
of justice “regulate the choice of a political constitution and the main elements of the eco-
nomic and social system” (7). Later in the same book he writes: “In justice as fairness the 
original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory 
of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual his-
torical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a 
purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice” 
(12). To this passage, he appends a footnote, which reads: “Kant is clear that the original 
agreement is hypothetical” (12n5).
26. The basics of this decision were already outlined in the first edition of The Imagi-
nary Museum. There, she states that her historical approach “does not obviate the need 
for ontology.” On the contrary, the importance of ontology remains but is now “recon-
ceived to become inextricably tied to history.” What she sought first and foremost was 
the compatibility of historical and ontological claims, and she adjusted her “method-
ological approach” accordingly. In executing this approach, she writes, “[t]he major 
methodological transition is a move away from asking what kind of object a musical 
work is, to asking what kind of concept the work–concept is.” See Goehr (2007, 89–90). 
In “On the Problems of Dating,” she recalled that “My ontology, admittedly, moved 
from the domain of objects to that of concepts, from the world of objects to conceptual 
schemes; but this was by no means an unfamiliar or particularly radical move in philo-
sophical method” (Goehr 2000, 236).
27. The impossibility of saying anything at all about what might implicitly be a “work” 
is evident from a statement in The Imaginary Museum, where Goehr writes that a “piece 
of pottery or pile of bricks” can potentially be “transfigured into a work of art through 
the importation of relevant concepts.” Just as this transfiguration might take place, she 
says, so too since around 1800 one can speak of early music pieces as works by retro-
actively imposing the work–concept: “Implicit existence has become here essentially a 
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matter of retroactive attribution” (Goehr 2007, 115). But if this is so—if a pile of bricks 
can retroactively become a piece of art—then surely anything can become a piece of art, 
just as any sequence of sounds can become a work? This, in fact, seems to be Goehr’s 
point precisely. And again, it says nothing at all about Bach’s own music during his 
time: this, to take a Foucauldian view, would be to pass beyond the threshold of the 
knowable. With this logic, anything that falls under the work–concept at any time in 
history can retroactively be said to have implicitly been a work. Thus, for example, if a 
free jazz performance is later transcribed and performed note–for–note under the logic 
of the work–concept, then the free jazz performance was implicitly a work. It seems to 
me that this particular notion is blunt and requires more attention.
28. The only exception that I know of is Richard Middleton (2000, 86), who has sug-
gested (following Richard Williams) that by “by rewriting Miles Davis and Bob Marley 
in the light of later musical developments,” the bass player and producer Bill Laswell 
“reveal[ed] what they were ‘really’ (that is, latently) about . . .” “By turning the texture 
inside out,” suggests Middleton, “Laswell has in one sense certainly discovered ele-
ments that were embryonically present and put them in the centre . . .” (68).
29. For a parallel argument about money, see Yuran 2014, 38.
30. Yuran writes that “[t]he claim that the transition occurs at the very beginning 
solves” the impossibility of locating the exact moment of transition at some later date. 
“But,” he says, “it is important to note that it solves a fundamental enigma of the story 
not in a technical manner, by showing a mechanism that allows the transition from 
matter to symbol. Rather, it solves it by transforming these basic elements of the story, 
by forcing us to rethink the categories of ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ that we use in tell-
ing the story, and so in this respect constitute it . . . To put it in the simplest terms it is 
no longer a story of transition from material money to symbolic money. Rather, the real 
transition is from symbolic matter to material symbol: from a matter that obscures its 
own symbolic function to a symbol that obscures its own materiality” (Yuran 2009, 146; 
emphasis in the original).
31. See especially Chapters 3 and 4 in Yuran 2014.
32. For an excellent critique from the perspective of music theory, see Christensen 
1993.
33. Goehr also recognizes that retroactive histories harbor a certain danger. Referring 
to the difference between emergence and origin, Goehr writes that, “Strohm does not 
acknowledge this separation.” And although Goehr herself insists on the distinction, 
she nonetheless acknowledges that Strohm is “[p]erhaps . . . right not to, given the 
potentially dangerous consequence he sees. The trouble with engaging in retroactive 
history—looking backward for origins of a fully developed concept—is that is encour-
ages the tendency to read ideological and aesthetic baggage backward as well. What 
‘backward’–looking historians tend to do is to read past history as if it is rationally or 
naturally developing into the state from which they begin their inquiry” (2007, 238). 
Of course, Goehr (like Yuran) still does advocate a particular kind of retroactive (or 
what I would call “teleological”) view of history, despite noticing its potential problems.
34. As a student of Slavoj Žižek, Yuran makes use of the notion that history is consti-
tuted not by omniscience (all–knowing) but rather by non–knowledge. In his seminal 
text, The Sublime Object of Ideology (a book that Yuran has translated into Hebrew), 
Žižek (1989, 21) addresses this question in a discussion of ideology: “ideology is not 
simply a ‘false consciousness,’ an illusory representation of reality, it is rather this real-
ity itself which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological’—‘ideological’ is a social reality 
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whose very existence implies the nonknowledge of its participants as to its essence—
that is, the social effectivity, the very reproduction of which implies that the individuals 
‘do not know what they are doing.’ ‘Ideology’ is not the ‘false consciousness’ of a (social) 
being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by ‘false consciousness’.” See also 
Yuran (2009, 114).
35. Yuran’s ideas are based, in part, on Gordon Graham’s attempt to encourage historians to 
take the philosophy of history more seriously. Graham writes that “historians may, if they 
choose, restrict themselves to recording how events were contemporaneously perceived, 
but . . . a preference for doing so does not show that there is anything illegitimate about 
constructing a narrative which makes use of historical perspective and the benefits of hind-
sight. However, such a perspective will commonly employ ideas of success and failure, ad-
vance and decline, and these are concepts which frequently require philosophical analysis 
and conceptual imagination.” See Graham 1997, as quoted in Yuran 2009, 111–12. See also 
Yuran 2014, 204–205, for a reworking of his earlier ideas.
36. “In this case,” he continues, “historical knowledge in itself has no uniqueness in rela-
tion with other disciplines of knowledge of man—it is simply a sociology, anthropology, or 
economics of the past” (Yuran 2014, 205).
37. This point notwithstanding, Tomlinson’s approach is more flexible than Foucault’s. See 
his critiques of Foucauldian archaeology (Tomlinson 1993, xi, 35–43, 57–58).
38. As another example, Piekut (2014) considers the case of the musical circle that emerged 
around Karl Franz Brendel in the mid–nineteenth century. A full account, says Piekut, may 
include a reader of the Neue Zeitschrift für Muzik, but also “a cup of coffee, a café, and a text” 
(6). For Piekut, a coffee cup and a café are not essences, nor are they vibrant materialities 
whose morphogenetic properties act on the world. Instead, the various actors in his hypo-
thetical account (reader, cup, café, text) constitute a reality when they enter into a network. 
Reality, from an actor–network theory perspective, is constituted through multiple associa-
tions between an ultimately unknown set of actors: “Being means ‘being related’ and ‘being 
in the world’” (10).
39. In a similar vein, as the work–concept took on a regulative function during the course of 
the nineteenth century, the “concept” of the work took on the form of musical works them-
selves—Beethoven symphonies, Wagner operas, and so on. In this way, the work–concept 
was treated as if it was not a concept at all.
40. For historical materialists like Yuran and Goehr, social reality is materialized within 
particular objects. Hence, historical materialism does not seek the mysteriousness of his-
tory in the places where Latour looks for it. Here is a typical list of “added back” actors for 
Latour (1988, 198), “the tree that springs up again, the locusts that devour the crops, the 
cancer that beats others at its own game, the mullahs who dissolve the Persian empire, the 
Zionists who loosen the hold of the mullahs, the concrete in the power station that cracks, 
the acrylic blues that consume other pigments, and the lion that does not follow the pre-
dictions of the oracle.” (This “litany” is famously quoted in Bogost 2012, 39.) Historical 
materialism, by contrast, seeks the mystery of the social inside the object. As Yuran (2014, 
64–65) says, a thing “assumes a social role precisely insofar as there is a mystery in it that 
marks that aspect of the social that is not reducible to the perception of individual subjects. 
It assumes an irreducibly social and historical role precisely to the extent that it is uncanny, 
that there is something in it that transcends our knowledge of it.”
41. This implies that “teleological history” means only that historical inquiry can benefit 




Adorno, Theodor W. 1997. Aesthetic Theory. Translated by Robert Hullot Kentor. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Attali, Jacques. 1985. Noise: The Political Economy of Music. Translated by Brian Massumi. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Bogost, Ian. 2012. Alien Phenomenology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Christensen, Thomas. 1993. “Music Theory and its Histories.” In Music Theory and the 
Exploration of the Past, edited by Christopher Hatch and David W. Bernstein, 9–39. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Dyck, John. 2010. “Did Bach Compose Musical Works? An Evaluation of Goehr’s 
Watershed Thesis.” Master’s thesis, University of Manitoba.
Erauw, William. 1998. “Canon Formation: Some More Reflections on Lydia Goehr’s 
Imaginary Museum of Musical Works.” Acta Musicologica 70: 109–15.
Gallagher, Sean. “Doublets, Multiforms, and the Work–Concept in Fifteenth Century 
Song Repertories.” Paper presented at the American Musicological Society 
conference, Toronto, 2000.
Goehr, Lydia. 1992. The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy 
of Music. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   . 2000. “‘On the Problems of Dating’ or ‘Looking Backward and Forward with 
Strohm’.” In The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?, edited by Michael Talbot, 231–
46. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
   . 2007. The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of 
Music. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Graham, Gordon. 1997. The Shape of the Past: A Philosophical Approach to History. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kerman, Joseph. 1985. Contemplating Music. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Latour, Bruno. 1988. The Pasteurization of France. Translated by Alan Sheridan and John 
Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Malraux, André. 1978. “Museum without Walls.” In The Voices of Silence. Translated by 
Stuart Gilbert. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
McClary, Susan. 1987. “The Blasphemy of Talking Politics During Bach Year.” In Music 
and Society: The Politics of Composition, Performance, and Reception, edited by 
Richard Leppert and Susan McClary, 13–62. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Middleton, Richard. 2000. “Work–in–(g) Practice: Configuration of the Popular Music 
Intertext.” In The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?, edited by Michael Talbot, 59–
87. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Moreno, Jairo, and Gavin Steingo. 2012. “Rancière’s Equal Music.” Contemporary Music 
Review 31 (5–6): 487–505. Special issue on “Music and Philosophy,” edited by Martin 
Scherzinger.
Ochoa Gautier, Ana María. 2014. Aurality: Listening and Knowledge in Nineteenth–
Century Colombia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Perkins, Leeman. 2003. “Concerning the Ontological Status of the Notated Musical 
Work in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries.” Current Musicology 75: 15–49.
Piekut, Benjamin. 2011. Experimentalism Otherwise: The New York Avant–Garde and its 
Limits. Berkeley: University of California Press.
   . 2014. “Actor–Networks in Music History: Clarifications and Critiques.” 
Twentieth Century Music 11 (2): 191–215.
Rancière, Jacques. 2004. The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible. Translated 
by Gabriel Rockhill. London: Continuum.
112
Current Musicology
   . 2009. Aesthetics and its Discontents. Translated by Steven Corcoran. London: Polity Press.
Rawls, John. 1955. “Two Concepts of Rules.” Philosophical Review 64: 3–32.
   . 1971. Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Seidel, Wilhelm. 1987. Werk und Werkbegriff in der Musikgeschichte. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Sisman, Elaine. 2008. “Six of One: The Opus Concept in the Eighteenth Century.” In The 
Century of Bach and Mozart: Perspectives on Historiography, Composition, Theory and 
Performance, edited by Thomas Forest Kelly and Sean Gallagher, 79–107. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
Smith, Adam. 1904. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: 
Methuen and Co.
Sohn–Rethel, Alfred. 1978. Intellectual and Manual Labor: A Critique of Epistemology. 
Translated by Martin Sohn–Rethel. London: MacMillan.
Strohm, Reinhard. 2000. “Looking Back at Ourselves: The Problem with the Musical Work 
Concept.” In The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?, edited by Michael Talbot, 128–52. 
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Tagg, Philip. 2000. “‘The Work’: An Evaluative Charge.” In The Musical Work: Reality or 
Invention?, edited by Michael Talbot, 153–67. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Talbot, Michael. 2000. Introduction to The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?, edited by 
Michael Talbot, 1–13. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Taruskin, Richard. 2007. “Forward.” In The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay 
in the Philosophy of Music, by Lydia Goehr, v–viii. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Tomlinson, Gary. 1993. Music and Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
   . 1999. Metaphysical Song: An Essay on Opera. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Tormey, Alan. 1974. “Indeterminacy and Identity in Art.” Monist 58: 203–15.
Wegman, Rob C. 1996. “From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship 
in the Low Countries, 1450–1500.” Journal of the American Musicological Society 49 (3): 
409–79.
White, Harry. 1997. “‘If It Ain’t Baroque, Don’t Fix It’: Reflections on Lydia Goehr’s ‘Work 
Concept’ and the Historical Integrity of Musical Composition.” Acta Musicologica 69: 
94–104.
Wiora, Walter. 1983. Das Musikalische Kunstwerk. Tutzing: Hans Schneider.
Young, James O. 2005. “The ‘Great Divide’ in Music.” British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (2): 
175–84.
Yuran, Noam. 2009. “Rethinking Money Through Desire: A Philosophical Historical 
Inquiry Into the Nature of Money.” Ph.D. diss. Ben–Gurion University at Negev.
   . 2014. What Does Money Want? An Economy of Desire. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Žižek, Slavoj. 1989. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
